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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
TINA JACKSON and 
KELLY NORTON, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals by Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2d). This is an appeal from a 
final judgment on the defendants' Motion For Relief From Judgment. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
Plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to a "Landlords") brought 
suit against pro se defendants (herein referred to as "Tenants") in 
unlawful detainer. Trial in the Second Circuit Court in Ogden, 
Utah, was held on January 18, 1995. Judge Heffernan ordered 
tenants to immediately vacate the leased property and to leave all 
their personal property at the rented premises. The court relied 
upon the following lease term in concluding that tenants would not 
be allowed to remove their property from the leased premises: 
"Furniture, fixtures and personal property of the tenant may not be 
removed from the premises until rent or other charges are fully 
paid." After a hearing dated January 27, 1995, tenants were 
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permitted to retrieve a small portion of their personal property. 
On March 17, 1995, tenants filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment 
seeking the return of their property. The trial court denied this 
motion and this appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court commit error by refusing to set aside its 
order and by enforcing a lease term which conflicts with state law, 
Utah Code §§ 38-3-1, 78-23-5, 8 and 78-36-10.5 and deprives tenants 
of their property? The standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
Udv v. Udv, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code § 38-3-1 
Utah Code § 78-23-5 and 8 
Utah Code § 78-36-10.5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. NATURE OF THE CASE: This case began as an action for unlawful 
detainer. The court's order of restitution precluded tenants from 
removing their personal property. This appeal concerns the manner 
of execution of the order of restitution. 
b. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: This action was commenced by the 
landlords in the Second Circuit Court of Weber County, Ogden City 
Department, on December 12, 1994. On December 19, 1994, tenants 
filed a pro se answer. On January 18f 1995, a trial was held and 
judgment awarded to landlrods for restoration of the premises. On 
January 19, 1995, tenants filed a motion for an immediate hearing. 
A hearing was held on January 27, 1995, and the court issued an 
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amended judgment on January 27, 1995. On March 17, 1995, tenants 
filed a motion for relief from judgment which was denied on April 
21, 1995. This appeal was filed May 19, 1995. 
c. DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT: The court ordered tenants to 
vacate the premises immediately and ordered them not to remove any 
personal items without paying all past due rent. 
d. RELEVANT FACTS: 
1. Tenants rented an apartment from landlords. On December 
12, 1994, landlords filed a complaint for eviction (Unlawful 
Detainer), alleging non-payment of rent. (R. 001) On December 19, 
1994, tenants filed a pro se answer. (R. Oil) 
2. At a January 18, 1995 hearing, the circuit court ordered 
tenants and their four minor children, ages 3, 6, 7 and 7, to 
immediately vacate the leased property and to leave their personal 
property. (R. 017) The court relied upon the following lease 
paragraph: "Furniture, fixtures and personal property of the tenant 
may not be removed from the premises until rent or other charges 
are fully paid." (R. 022) 
3. No writ of restitution was served upon tenants. 
4. No sheriff or constable inventoried tenants' personal 
property or stored it. 
5. After the January 20 order was issued, landlords refused 
to release personal property and prescriptive medicine belonging to 
tenants' minor children. 
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6. By order of January 27, 1995, the court amended its prior 
order and permitted tenants to retrieve a small portion of the 
personal property belonging to their minor children. (R. 018) 
7. By written notice on February 21, 1995, tenants requested 
that landlords relinquish their personal property, pursuant to Utah 
Code § 78-36-10.5(4)(b)(i). (R. 021) 
8. Landlords refused to release any property. 
9. On April 21, 1995, the court denied tenants' motion for 
relief from judgment ruling that " . . . the contract provisions 
regarding tenants' property shall apply. ..." (R. 024) Landlords 
still hold tenants' property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in refusing to set aside its order which 
ignored state laws on exempt property and eviction procedures and 
which allowed landlords to keep tenants' property after an 
eviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE 
ITS ORDER AND BY ENFORCING A LEASE TERM, EVEN THOUGH 
ENFORCEMENT WAS CONTRARY TO UTAH CODE §§ 38-3-1, 78-23-5, 
8 AND 78-36-10.5-
Tenants contend that the trial court erred by refusing to set 
aside its order which violated Utah statutes defining exempt 
property and providing for the release of a tenant's property after 
eviction. Specifically, the tenants claim that the lease term 
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prohibiting property removal until rent obligations are satisfied, 
which the court relied on in its order, conflicts with Utah Code §§ 
38-3-1, 78-23-5 and 8 and 78-36-10.5. 
The court's failure to comply with the above statutes has 
resulted in tenants being unable to retrieve their household 
belongings, including beds, mattresses, box springs, appliances, 
microwave oven, food processor, toasters, bicycles, clothing, 
papers and other personal items. By enforcing this unlawful lease 
term and elevating it above state law, the court has authorized the 
landlord to convert tenants' property to their own use and made 
such self help "lawful", disregarding the policy behind Utah's 
unlawful detainer statute, exempt property statute and statutory 
restitution procedure. 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied contract law to landlord-
tenant cases for more then a decade. In the case of Wade v. Jobe, 
818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991), for example, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated "... this court has conformed the common law in this 
state to contemporary conditions by rejecting the strict 
application of traditional property law to residential leases, 
recognizing that it is often more appropriate to apply contract 
law." Other cases supporting the application of contract 
principles in the interpretation of a lease include: Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins Co. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989; Williams v. Melbv, 
699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); and Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 
1981). 
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And under contract law, private parties may not by agreement 
or rule render ineffective rules and standards provided by statute. 
The clause here should have been declared void, not enforced. In 
People in Matter of K.M.K. , 780 P.2d 43 (Colo.App 1989), for 
example, an attorney and her client agreed the attorney would be 
compensated at $140 per hour for adoption services and $60 per hour 
for paralegal services. The total cost billed for the legal 
service was $4,933.43. The trial court, looking to the Colorado 
Childrens Code, ruled an attorney could charge reasonable fees, but 
only those fees "... customarily performed by such persons." The 
trial court held, and the Colorado appellate court affirmed, that 
attorneys could not exceed the customary fee of $2000. In so 
ruling, the court concluded that an attorney/client contract is 
valid and enforceable provided it does not conflict with state 
statutes. Since that contract clause did conflict, it was declared 
void, as the agreement conflicted with existing customary fee 
provisions of the Colorado Childrens Code. 
In Gonzalez v. Industrial Commission of State, 740 P.2d 999, 
1002 (Colo. 1987), the court reached a similar result. In that 
case, employer guidelines determined eligibility for unemployment 
benefits. The court ruled "... the determination of eligibility 
for unemployment compensation benefits and of standards of 
disqualification are matters within the province of the General 
Assembly . . . Private parties may not by agreement or rules render 
ineffectual the rules and standards provided by statute." Again, 
the statute predominated over the private agreement. 
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The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Second, at Section 
580, reaches a similar conclusion: a contract that is contrary to 
the terms of a legislative enactment is illegal or unenforceable. 
This policy was used in Ross v. Producers Mutual Insurance Company. 
295 P.2d. 339 (Utah 1956) to void a contract provision authorizing 
an insurance company to purchase stock since the stock purchase 
conflicted with Utah Code § 31-27-15. 
In this case, the parties agreed the tenants' personal 
property would remain on the premises until rent or other charges 
were paid. This lease term conflicts with Utah Code § 78-36-10.5 
and should likewise be declared void. 
Pursuant to the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statute, Utah Code § 
78-36-10.5, a landlord may, after issuance of an Order of 
Restitution, obtain a Writ of Restitution, and have a sheriff or 
constable serve the writ and notify the tenant to vacate and remove 
their property. If they fail to do so in the time period allowed by 
the court, the sheriff or constable must inventory the property and 
arrange for its storage in a suitable place and in a reasonable 
manner. The statute further provides for the "prompt return" of 
any personal property left behind by a vacating tenant, provided 
the landlord is reimbursed for costs associated with the removal, 
transportation, and storage of said property. 
The court here, in enforcing the lease term, prohibited 
tenants from removing their household property, thus depriving them 
of their property, as well as depriving them of the statutory right 
to retrieve said property. As a policy matter, "[c]ourts will not 
7 
enforce or aid in enforcement of a contract made in violation of 
law. . . . " An-Cor, Inc. v. Rehermank, 835 P.2d 93, 96 (Okl. 
1992). The trial court should not have enforced this contractual 
provision. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ORDER AND BY 
ENFORCING A SELF HELP LEASE PROVISION THAT WAS VOID AS 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
By judicially authorizing landlords to hold tenants' property, 
the trial court was authorizing a self-help remedy in direct 
contravention of Utah case law concerning landlord-tenant matters 
and public policy. In Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States 
Wholesale Supp, 451 P.2d 778, 781(Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme 
Court reviewed the common law in England and the United States 
before concluding that a lease provision which permitted the 
landlord to take possession without notice or legal process if rent 
had not been paid for a period of 15 days was void as against 
public policy, since the forcible entry and detainer statute 
provided an adequate and speedy remedy. 
In Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court followed Freeway. The tenant sued because 
the landlord forcibly evicted her and retained possession of her 
property without resort to judicial process. The landlord admitted 
he retained the personal property to secure payment of rent, much 
like the present case. The court concluded the following: 
The Code gives a landlord a lien on a lessee's non-exempt 
property for rent due. However , to secure physical attachment 
of the property he must resort to the courts. A writ of 
attachment must be sought and can be obtained only upon the 
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filing of an action against the tenant. . . . A bond must 
also be filed. . . . Absent compliance with the Code, seizing 
a tenant's property by self-help is a civil wrong and is 
actionable as a tort. . . . Self-help is too likely to lead 
to a breach of the peace to be permitted, and contractual 
provisions purporting to authorize it will be void as against 
public policy." 
The same principles apply in this case. The landlords relied upon 
and the court accepted just such a contractual provision purporting 
to authorize self help conversion of the tenants' property . By 
prohibiting tenants from taking possession of their personal 
property, the trial court sanctioned the same behavior condemned in 
Freeway Park Building and Pentecost. The court disregarded this 
clear and binding case law in permitting the landlord to hold 
tenants' property. 
POINT III, 
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ORDER AND BY 
FAILING TO ORDER THE LANDLORD TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF 
UTAH CODE, § 78-36-10.5. 
The 1994 Utah legislature enacted legislation effective on May 
2, 1994 that established the only procedure to be used in enforcing 
judgments in unlawful detainer and in forcible entry and detainer 
cases. In summary, Utah Code § 78-36-10.5 requires the tenant to 
vacate and remove personal property if the court rules in favor of 
the landlord. The tenant must be notified of their right to a 
hearing and given a hearing request form. If the tenant does not 
vacate voluntarily, a sheriff or constable must inventory the 
property, arrange for storage and provide a means for its return 
upon payment of reasonable costs. The statute does not allow 
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landlords to permanently keep tenants' property, particularly 
property exempt by law. 
The order of restitution issued by the trial court (R. 017) 
here simply ignored this statute and the procedure it established 
and denied the tenants their rights guaranteed by law. The defects 
in the procedure here included:1 
a) the order prohibited the tenants from removing their 
personal property; 
b) the defendants were not served with a writ of 
restitution; 
c) no sheriff or constable was involved in the 
enforcement of the restitution order; 
d) the tenants were not advised of their right to a hearing, 
nor was a hearing request form provided; 
e) the sheriff or constable did not transport the property to 
a suitable safe storage facility; 
f) the sheriff or constable did not inventory the tenants' 
personal property; 
g) the sheriff or constable could not return, upon fee 
payment, the personal property within 30 days of property removal. 
All of these errors make the court's refusal to set aside its 
judgment and order of restitution even more egregious. Here the 
landlord, with the help and sanction of the court, failed to follow 
the clearly articulated statutory procedures for eviction, in 
blatant disregard of the newly passed law. 
xThe statute in its entirety is included in the addendum, at 
A-3. 
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POINT IV, 
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ORDER AND BY 
ORDERING THE LANDLORD TO TAKE POSSESSION OF TENANTS' 
PERSONAL PROPERTY WITHOUT OBTAINING A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT 
OR OTHER APPROPRIATE ORDER. 
Under Utah law, all non-exempt property of a tenant kept or 
brought upon leased property is subject to a lien for rent due. 
Utah Code § 38-3-1. This is the lessor's lien. This statutory 
lien attaches immediately. However, this does not give the 
landlord any right to possession of such property. The lien only 
allows a landlord to have a tenant's nonexempt property seized 
under a writ of attachment by an officer and held pending a 
determination of the priorities of the claims, liens, and security 
interests in such property. The writ of attachment cannot be 
obtained without the filing of an appropriate affidavit and the 
posting of a bond in an amount double the alleged damages. 
The court, by prohibiting the tenants from removing their 
personal property, disregarded the lessors' lien provisions of the 
Utah Code, in essence granted a possessory lien without compliance 
with the statute and provided the landlord with a remedy not 
authorized by statute, namely retaining the tenants' personal 
property without complying with the statute. This is bad policy. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ORDER AND BY 
PERMITTING THE LANDLORD TO TAKE POSSESSION OF TENANTS' 
PERSONAL PROPERTY SINCE IT IS EXEMPT FROM ATTACHMENT. 
In addition to the foregoing, the court violated the tenants' 
rights under the Utah exemption statute which precludes the seizure 
of certain property even if a valid writ of attachment or execution 
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is issued. Even if a tenant owes money to the landlord, this 
statute recognizes the importance of a family's minimal 
possessions. Utah Code § 78-23-5 and 8 exempt household 
furnishings and appliances as well as certain specified property. 
Most if not all of tenants' property is thus exempt from seizure. 
And Utah Code § 78-23-11 precludes waiver of these rights. 
By upholding such a waiver of exemption rights and then 
authorizing landlord to seize and hold all of tenants' property, 
exempt and non-exempt, the court permitted the landlords to break 
the law. Ironically, the court, in attempting to protect the 
rights of the prevailing party, disregarded minimal statutory 
protections to this low income family. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court enforced a contract provision that authorized 
the landlord to withhold possession of the tenants' personal 
property. In so doing, the court disregarded Utah law and case law 
and permitted a "self help" lease clause to supersede statutory 
authority. 
The decision below should be reversed and the portion of the 
judgment concerning tenants' property set aside. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fjs*? day of August 1995. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
By: \^u^7V T^E 
MARTON S . BLAUSTEIN 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code § 38-3-1, et seq. Page A-l 
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38-3-1 38-3-2 LIENS 
CHAPTER 3 
LESSORS' LIENS 
Section 
38-3-1 Lien for rent due 
38-3-2 Priority of lessor's hen 
38-3-3 Attachment in aid of hen 
38-3-4 Attachment —- Affidavit and bond 
38-3-5 When attachment will issue — Determina-
tion of priorities 
38-3-6 Execution of writ of attachment 
38-3-7 Release of attachment — Bond 
38-3-8 When chapter not applicable 
38-3-1. Lien for rent due. 
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have a 
hen for rent due upon all nonexempt property of the 
lessee brought or kept upon the leased premises so 
A-l 
long as the lessee shall occupy said premises and for 
thirty days thereafter 1853 
38-3-2. Priority of lessor's lien. 
The hen provided for m this chapter shall be pre-
ferred to all other hens or claims except claims for 
taxes and hens of mechanics under Chapter 1 of this 
t i t le, perfected security interests, and claims of em-
ployees for wages which are preferred by law, pro-
vided, tha t when a lessee shall be adjudicated a bank-
rupt , or shall make an assignment for the benefit of 
creditors, or when his property shall be put into the 
possession of a receiver, the hen herein provided for 
shall be limited to the rent for ninety days prior 
thereto 1977 
38-3-3. At tachment in aid of hen. 
Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid under 
a lease, or the lessee shall be about to remove his 
property from the leased premises, the lessor may 
have the personal property of the lessee which is upon 
the leased premises and subject to such hen attached 
without other ground for such attachment 1953 
38-3-4. Attachment — Affidavit and bond. 
The lessor shall before the issue of such writ of 
a t tachment file a complaint, and an affidavit duly 
sworn to set t ing forth the amount of rent due over 
and above all offsets and counterclaims and a brief 
description of the leased premises, and shall further 
state, under oath tha t such writ of at tachment is not 
sued out for the purpose of vexing or harassing the 
lessee, and the person applying for such writ of at-
tachment shall execute and file a bond as in other 
cases of a t tachment 1953 
38-3-5. When attachment will issue — Determi-
nat ion of priorities. 
Upon the filing of such complaint, affidavit and 
bond it shall be the duty of the court wherein the 
same are filed to issue a writ of at tachment to the 
proper officer, commanding him to seize the property 
of the defendant subject to such hen, or so much 
thereof as will satisfy the demand, and to make a 
determination of the priorities of the claims, hens, 
and security interests in such property 1977 
38-3-6 Execution of writ of attachment. 
It shall be the duty of the officer to whom the writ 
of attachment is directed to seize the property of such 
\essee subject to such hen, or as much thereof as shaft 
be necessary to satisfy such debt and costs, and to 
keep the same until the determination of the action, 
unless the property is sooner released by bond or the 
attachment is discharged 1953 
38-3-7. Release of attachment — Bond. 
A bond for the release of the attached property may 
be given, and motion to discharge the attachment 
may be made, as provided in the Code of Civil Proce-
dure in cases of at tachment 1953 
38-3-8. When chapter not applicable. 
This chapter shall not be applicable to a written 
lease for a term of years in which, as part of the con-
sideration thereof, the lessee or assigns shall erect a 
building or improvements upon the leased premises 
1953 
78-23-6 
78-23-5. Property exempt from execution. 
(1) An individual is entitled to exemption of the 
following property: 
(a) a burial plot for the individual and his fam-
ily; 
(b) health aids reasonably necessary to enable 
the individual or a dependent to work or sustain 
health; 
(c) benefits the individual or his dependent 
have received or are entitled to receive by reason 
of disability, illness, or unemployment from any 
source; 
(d) benefits paid or payable for medical, surgi-
cal, or hospital care to the extent they are used 
by an individual or his dependent to pay for such 
care; 
(e) veterans benefits; 
(f) money or property received, and rights to 
receive money or property for child support; 
(g) one clothes washer and dryer, one refriger-
ator, one freezer, one stove, one sewing machine, 
all carpets in use, provisions sufficient for three 
months actually provided for individual or family 
use, all wearing apparel of every individual and 
dependent, not including jewelry or furs, and all 
beds and bedding for every individual or depen-
dent; 
(h) works of art depicting the debtor or the 
debtor and his resident family, or produced by 
the debtor or the debtor and his resident family, 
except works of art held by the debtor as part of a 
trade or business; 
(i) proceeds of insurance, a judgment, or a set-
tlement, or other rights accruing as a result of 
bodily injury of the individual or of the wrongful 
death or bodily injury of another individual of 
whom the individual was or is a dependent to the 
extent that such proceeds are compensatory; 
(j) any money or other assets payable to the 
individual as a participant or beneficiary from or 
an interest of the individual as a participant or 
beneficiary in a retirement plan or arrangement 
which is described in Sections 401(a), 401(h), 
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of 
the United States Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended. This exemption shall not ap-
ply: 
(i) to an alternate payee under a qualified 
domestic relations order, as those terms are 
defined in Section 414(p) of the United 
States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended; or 
(ii) to amounts contributed or benefits ac-
crued by or on behalf of a debtor within 180 
days before the debtor files for bankruptcy; 
or 
(iii) to the assets of bankruptcy proceed-
ings filed before January 1, 1989; 
(k) the interest of or any money or other assets 
payable to an alternate payee under a qualified 
domestic relations order as those terms are de-
fined in Section 414(p) of the United States Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
(2) Exemptions under this section do not limit 
items which may be claimed as exempt under Section 
78-23-8. 1989 
78-23-8. E x e m p t property u p to aggregate value 
of $500 — Exempt ion of implements , 
professional books, tools, motor vehi-
cle up to $1,500. 
(1) An individual is entitled to exemption of the 
following property up to an aggregate value of items 
in each subparagraph of $500 : 
(a) furnishings and appliances reasonably nec-
essary for one household; 
(b) animals, books, and musical instruments, 
if reasonably held for the personal use of the indi-
vidual or his dependents; 
(c) an heirloom or other item of particular sen-
timental value to the individual. 
(2) An individual is entitled to an exemption of im-
plements, professional books, or tools of the trade of 
the individual, all having an aggregate value not ex-
ceeding $1,500; and one motor vehicle having a value 
not exceeding $1,500 where such motor vehicle is 
used for the claimant's business or profession. Busi-
ness or professional use of a motor vehicle does not 
include transportation to and from a claimant's place 
of work or business. 
(3) This section does not affect property exempt un-
der Section 78-23-5. 1981 
78-23-11. Waiver of exemptions in favor of 
unsecured creditor unenforceable. 
A waiver of exemptions executed in favor of an 
unsecured creditor before levy on an individual's 
property is unenforceable. 1981 
78-36-10.5 78-36-11 
78-36-10 5. Order of restitution — Service — En-
forcement — Disposition of personal 
property — Hearing 
(1) Each or^er of restitution shall 
(a) dife ct the defendant to vacate the prem-
ises, rei^ove his personal property, and restore 
possession °f the premises to the plaintiff, or be 
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable, 
(b) a d v l s e the defendant of the time limit set 
by the c^urt for the defendant to vacate the prem-
ises, whi c n shall be three business days following 
service 0? the order unless the court determines 
that a logger or shorter period is appropriate un 
der the circumstances, and 
(c) a d v l s e the defendant of his right to a hear-
ing to contest the terms of the order of restitution 
or the tfianner of its enforcement 
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form 
for the defendant to request a hearing shall be 
served personally upon the defendant in accor-
dance w'rth Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure If personal service is impossible or imprac-
ticable, service may be made by mailing a copy of 
the ord0r ana* the form to the defendant's last-
known address and posting a copy of the order 
and the f ° r m a t a conspicuous place on the prem-
ises 
(b) Tfre d a t e °f service, the name, title, signa-
ture, and telephone number of the person serving 
the order ana" the forrn shall be legibly endorsed 
on the copy of the order and the form served on 
the defendant 
(c) Within t e n d a v s °f service, the person serv-
ing the order and the form shall file proof of ser-
vice in accordance with Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of 
Civil procedure 
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the 
order within the time prescribed by the court, a 
sheriff or constable at the plaintiffs direction 
may enter the premises by force using the least 
destructive means possible to remove the defen-
dant 
(b) Any personal property of the defendant 
may be removed from the premises by the sheriff 
<\r cATxstahla and transported tA a. suitable loca-
tion for safe storage The sheriff or constable, 
with the plaintiffs consent, may delegate respon-
sibility for storage to the plaintiff, who must 
store the personal property in a suitable place 
and in a reasonable manner 
(c) The personal property removed and stored 
shall be inventoried by the sheriff or constable 
who shall keep the original inventory and per-
sonally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of 
the inventory immediately after the personal 
property is removed 
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant 
within 30 days of removal of personal property 
from the premises, the sheriff or constable shall 
promptly return all of the defendant's personal 
property upon payment of the reasonable costs 
incurred for its removal and storage 
(b) The person storing the personal property 
may sell the property remaining m storage at a 
public sale if 
(l) the defendant does not request a hear-
ing or demand return of the personal prop-
erty within 30 days of its removal from the 
premises, or 
(n) the defendant fails to pay the reason-
able costs incurred for the removal and stor-
age of the personal property 
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing 
the personal property shall mail to the defen-
dant's last-known address a written notice of the 
time and place of the sale 
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he 
may specify the order in which the personal prop-
erty shall be sold, and only so much personal 
property shall be sold as to satisfy the costs of 
removal, storage, advertising, and conducting 
the sale The remainder of the personal property, 
if any, shall be released to the defendant If the 
defendant is not present at the sale, the proceeds, 
after deduction of the costs of removal, storage, 
advertising, and conducting the sale shall be paid 
to the plaintiff up to the amount of any judgment 
the plaintiff obtained against the defendant Any 
surplus shall be paid to the defendant, if the de-
fendant's whereabouts are known If the defen-
dant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus 
shall be disposed of in accordance with Title 78, 
Chapter 44, Uniform Unclaimed Property Act 
(e) If the property belonging to a person who is 
not a defendant is removed and stored in accor-
the property by delivering a written demand for 
its release to the sheriff or constable If the claim-
ant provides proper identification and evidence of 
ownership, the sheriff or constable shall 
promptly release the property at no cost to the 
claimant 
(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the terms 
of the order of restitution or the manner of its en-
forcement, the defendant or any person claiming to 
own stored personal property may file a request for a 
hearing The court shall set the matter for hearing 
within ten days from the filing of the request, or as 
soon thereafter as practicable, and shall mail notice 
of the hearing to the parties 
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms nee 
essary to implement this section 1994 
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C. E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS 
1255 E 2925 N 
NORTH OGDEN UTAH 84414 
ORDER4 OF RESTITUTION 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
PLAINTIFF (OWNER) C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS 
VS 
DEFENDANTS (TENANTS) TINA JACKSON AND KELLY NORTON 
830 24TH 
OGDEN UTAH 
ORDER OF 
RESTITUTION 
CASE NO. 
940008531 CV 
MOTION 
THE OWNER AND PLAINTIFF WENT TO TRIAL. OWNER HAS BEEN GRANTED 
JUDGEMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S NAMED ABOVE. THE OWNER'S RIGHT 
TO IMMEDIATE RESTITUTION OF THE PREMISES AND POSSESSION OF 
DEFENDANT(S) PROPERTY AT THE PREMISES WAS FOUND. 
DATED THIS /f DAY OF TAIL) * 1995 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
1) THAT POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES AT LISTED FOR THE DEFENDANT 
NAMED ABOVE (830 24TH ST) BE DELIVERED TO THE OWNER, AND THAT THE 
RENTER(S), AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING A RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY FROM THE 
RENTER(S) BE REMOVED FROM THESE PREMISES. p^-Pc^Sjx^f- ^ ^ 
2) IT IS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED THAT ALL '-JffiNSESW S) ' PERSONAL 
PROPERTY BE LEFT AT THE PREMISES. 
3) IT IS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED THAT THE THREE DAY WAITING 
PERIOD IS HEREBY WAIVED. THE SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE IS HEREBY 
DIRECTED TO EXECUTE THIS ORDER OF RESTITUTION IMMEDIATELY. 
DATED THIS <3D DAY 1995 
A-4 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
TINA JACKSON & KELLY NORTON, 
Defendant(s), 
D E C I S I O N 
Case No.: 95 CV 8531 
Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan 
The Court has previously ruled that the contract provisions 
regarding Defendant's property shall apply in the event of a 
default on the contract, as is the case. 
All previous orders shall remain in effect and Defendant's 
Motion for Relief from Judgment is denied-r-^ 
DATED this Chi day of April, 1995r-}/ 
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Decision, postage prepaid, to: 
C.E & BETTY BUTTERS 
Plaintiff's 
1255 E 2925 N 
N Ogden, UT 844 04 
MARTIN BLAUSTEIN 
Attorney for Defendant 
550 24th Street, Suite 300 
Ogden, UT 84401 
dated t h i s 2 day of A p r i l , 1995, 
D epftrfc^petfur £ € 1 e r k 
A-5 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Martin S. Blaustein, #3993 
Attorney for Defendants 
550 - 24th Street, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-9431 
(WATS) 1-800-662-2538 
(FAX) (801) 394-9434 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN CITY DEPARTMENT 
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTER BUTTERS, * 
* AMENDED ORDER 
Plaintiff, * 
* 
v. * 
* 
TINA JACKSON and * 
KELLY NORTON, * Judge: Pamela G. Heffernan 
* 
Defendants. * Civil No. 94-CV-853J 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan on 
Defendants' Motion for Immediate Hearing on January 27, 1995 at the 
hour of 9:00 a.m. The Defendants appeared in person and was 
represented by counsel, Martin S. Blaustein. The Plaintiff did not 
appear in person, nor was represented by counsel. Defendants' 
counsel mailed a copy of the motion on January 23, 1995. The 
Plaintiff, according to the clerk of the court, called from Idahq, 
claiming he did not receive the motion until January 26, 1995. 
The court having heard the Defendants' concern amends the 
prior order as follows: 
-'«H; J * 
A-6 
C.E. Butters v. Jackson, et al. 
Amended Order 
Civil No. 94-CV-853 
W
'
7
 tloPH'i: 
CERTIFICATE OF -MAILING 
I certify that a correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED 0£DER 
was mailed, via first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, thisr^' *! 
day of January 1995, to the following: 
C. E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, Pro se 
Plaintiff si 
1255 E. 2925 N. // 
North Ogden, UT/84414 // 
Secretary *~ / 
3 
LEASE 
C. E. BUTTERS OF 12 55 E 2 92 5 N NORTH OGDEN, COUNTY OF WEBF.R, 
STATE OF UTAH, HEREIN-AFTER REFERRED TO AS LANDLORD, HEREBY 
REMISE, RELEASE AND LET TO f T ^ A CTACXSONJ Q- tecUJf tQOKTVfiJ 
HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS TENANT, THE PREMISES KNOWN AS 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD SAID PREMISES, UNTO THE TENANT, FROM THE 
"ffiH DAY OF IMAG, , 19J&_ UNTIL THE 3^H DAY OF M/N 
, 19_3S_, A TERM OF *l nO'^Hs 1) PflTTs • 
TENANT COVENANTS AND AGREES TO PAY TO LANDLORD AS RENTAL FOR 
SAID PREMISES, THE SUM OF j>HS"7b *QQ Ecus. T H O U ^ P ^ Ft\ye Hi^ofceo <^ €*^ f fjvg 
DOLLARS PAYABLE AS FOLLOWS. 
$ ISO-OP fiufe 2^P. iW^Uoo-oo r>^  A*& «arf/ 1 W , j^U .oo 6 J sE<>r 1*5 r. iqW fl^p 
| TENANT HAS PAID THE SUM OF ^JJJZZJSS SECURITY DEPOSIT. IF 
TENANT VACATES THE PREMISES ON OR BEFORE MflV 1o TU , 19 c\*> 
NO REFUND SHALL BE GIVEN. IF THE TENANT, AFTER r^V ?t)fU , 
. 19*1*3
 f WHEN VACATING THE PREMISES, LEAVES THE PREMISES CLEAN, 1
 UNDAMAGED, AND DEBT FREE THE LANDLORD WILL REFUND 90% OF THE 
SECURITY DEPOSIT. 
TENANT FURTHER AGREES TO DELIVER UP SAID PREMISES TO LANDLORD 
AT THE EXPIRATION OF SAID TERM IN AS GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION AS 
WHEN THE SAME WERE ENTERED UPON BY TENANT, REASONABLE USE AND WEAR 
THEREOF AND DAMAGE BY THE ELEMENTS EXCEPTED. TENANT WILL NOT LET 
OR UNDERLET PREMISES. 
TENANT FURTHER COVENANTS AND AGREES THAT IF SAID RENT REMAINS 
UNPAID FOR THREE DAYS AFTER THE SAME SHALL BECOME DUE A SERVICE FEE 
OF $15.00 SHALL BE PAID BY THE TENANT TO THE i LANDLORD. ALSO TENANT 
AGREES THAT IF SAID MONIES ARE NOT PAID Wll'HIN THREE DAYS OF THE 
DUE DATE OR IF TENANT IS IN DEFAULT IN ANY OF THE COVENANTS HEREIN 
CONTAINED TO BE KEPT BY TENANT WI1JC1I ARE NOT CURED WITHIN THREE 
DAYS FROM THE WRITTEN NOTICE BY LANDLORD, OR IF TENANT SHALL VACATE 
SUCH PREMISES, LANDLORD MAY ELECT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR LEGAL PROCESS, 
TO RE-ENTER AND TAKE POSSESSION OF SAID PREMISES AND EVERY AND ANY 
PART THEREOF AND RE-LET THE SAME. 
LANDLORD MAY TERMINATE THIS LEASE WITH 10 DAYS WRITTEN NOTICE 
TO TENANT FOR ANY REASON. 
LANDLORD MAY INSPECT THE PREMISES FOR DAMAGE, CLEANLINESS AND 
REPAIRS AT ALL REASONABLE TIMES. ALSO LANDLORD SHALL SPECIFICALLY 
BE ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE PREMISES ON THE 1ST AND 151H OF EACH 
MONTH SOMETIME BETWEEN 7:00 AM AND 10:00 PM. 
TENANT SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING THEIR OWN ELECTRICAL 
POWER AND GAS BILLS. TENANT WILL SIGN UP FOR ALL UTILITIES PRIOR 
TO MOVING INTO PREMISES. (BRING RECEIPTS FOR KEYS. T^ftr^ ? Ptt S 
^Aree- — f£N>ftr^ r to PAY ftc nxAS^ Otffl- Of VGQO^-zzr PjtftZG yWScOGj 
X^' — uSftSP ^ T A ^ T pflTb ^fy\£cT TO ?Qjeyj£ovKs t £ ^ ^ 3 vJfli^ -rjcJG go v*:£r<\£, 
TENANT SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LOSSES RESULTING FROM 
NEGLIGENCE OR MISCONDUCT OF HIMSELF, HIS EMPLOYEES OR INVITEES. 
FURNITURE, FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF TENANT MAY NOT BE 
REMOVED FROM THE PREMISES UNTIL RENT OR OTHER CHARGES ARE FULLY 
PAID. 
NO PETS ALLOWED. 
IN CASE OF FAILURE TO FAITHFULLY PERFORM ' THE TERMS AND 
COVENANTS HEREIN SET FORTH, THE DEFAULTING PARTY SHALL PAY ALL 
COSTS EXPENSES, AND REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES RESULTING FROM THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY RIGHT ARISING OUT OF SUCH 
BREACH. 
TENAJHMS) AGRI^ E TO h\/L OF THE ABOVE TERMS AND COVENANTS. 
* % 
WITNESS ^ C ^ ^ ^ r ^ A^9 
C.E. Butters v. Jackson, et al. 
Amended Order > ..„ 
C i v i l No. 94-CV-853 w # / / *
 D : 
' -^ i *j I. 
O R D E R ? " r " / - ' . . ^ 
1. The children's prescriptive medication shall be promptly 
returned to Defendants• 
2. The children's clothing, shall be promptly returned. 
This shall include the children's bedding, blankets, pillows and 
sheets. 
3. The children's school books and materials shall be 
promptly returned. This includes all materials related to the 
children's education. 
4. The Defendants or Defendants' counsel shall communicate 
directory with the Plaintiff regarding a reasonable time to 
transfer the above property. The Plaintiff shall supervise and be 
present during this process. 
5. All other aspects of the prior order shall remain the 
same. 
DATED this day of ^ 1995. 
BY THE COUKT^) "* 
PAMELA.Of. HEFFERNAN 
Circuit: Cdurt Judge 
Date entered: 
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